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Abstract
This article argues for judicial review of the constitutionality of legislation or laws. This article opines that 
the judiciary is more favourable in discharging the function as the guardian of the constitution than other 
government bodies. According to Marbury v. Madison, the judiciary enjoys the jurisdiction of judicial re-
view to declare the unconstitutionality of legislation or laws because “it is emphatically the province and 
duty of the judicial department to say what the law is”.
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Intisari
Artikel ini membahas tentang pengujian yudisial konstitusionalitas undang-undang. Dalam artikel ini pe-
nulis berpendapat bahwa badan yudisial merupakan kandidat utama sebagai penjaga konstitusi ketimbang 
badan-badan pemerintahan yang lain. Pendapat ini didasarkan pada kasus Marbury v. Madison yang meya-
kini bahwa menentukan makna hukum adalah ranah dan tugas badan yudisial, termasuk dalam melakukan 
pengujian yudisial untuk menyatakan suatu undang-undang inkonstitusional.
Kata Kunci: konstitusi, pengujian yudisial, undang-undang.
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A. Introduction
This paper discusses institutional issues, 
especially in the review of the constitutionality of 
Laws. The focus of this paper is about legal remedy 
to ascertain that as the dicte of Law, the principle of 
human rights shall be obeyed by the legislative in 
forming laws by producing the coheren legislation 
in accordance to the Constitution which ensures the 
protection of human rights. That legal remedy is 
philosophically relative depending on the need of 
the state.
The legal remedy which will be discussed 
in this paper is spesific, which is in Judiciary. That 
process is called as judicial review of the consti-
tutionality of laws or legislations.1  Finck provides 
about the pre-condition of institutions of judicial 
review of the constitutionality of legislation or laws 
that:
First, it requires the existence of a written 
constitution which is conceived as a superior 
and fundamental law with clear supremacy 
over all other laws. Second, the constitution 
must be of a rigid character; the amendments 
or reforms that may be introduced can only 
be put into practice by means of a particular 
process. Third, the constitution must estab-
lish the judicial means for guaranteeing the 
supremacy of the constitution over legisla-
tive acts.2
Moreover, Michelman according to Tushnet 
provides criterias of the existence of institutions of 
judicial review of the constitutionality of legislation 
or laws in a state, namely:3  
a) Questions of the constitutionality of 
legislation are regularly brought be-
fore courts for resolution;
b) The courts address these questions 
afresh, with a substantial degree of 
independence from the explicit or im-
plicit opinions of other agents in the 
system including those who enacted 
the questioned law;
c) The resulting judgments of jurisdic-
tionally competent courts are regarded 
as binding on other departments of 
government unless and until revised 
either by judicial decision or by con-
stitutional amendment; and
d) The result of a judicial declaration of 
a legislative enactment’s unconstitu-
tionality is that the enactment thence-
forth is treated as invalid, voided of 
the force of law.
This paper will discuss the form of practices 
of the institution of judicial review of the constitu-
tionality of legislations or laws (American-style ju-
dicial review and Kelsen’s court) and the structure 
of theories to understand its background. To con-
duct the theorization of the institution of judicial re-
view of the constitutionality of legislation or laws, 
this paper will be focused on Marbury v. Madison 
Case as the general theory. General substances on 
the case of Marbury v. Madison can be examined to 
universally understand and explain the institution 
of judicial review of the constitutionality of legisla-
tion or laws, eventhough the practices of that pro-
cess is different among countries. 
B. Discussions
1. American-style Judicial Review vs Kel-sen’s 
Court
As explained before, there is no strict guide-
line about how the judicial review of the constitu-
tionality of legislation or laws shall be conducted. 
This is a very particular issue depending on tradi-
tion or interest among countries adjusting to their 
constitutions.4  Generally, there are two types of the 
model of review of the constitutionality of legisla-
tion or laws, namely judicial review and non-judi-
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cial review.5 Recently, judicial review is the best 
common mechanism employed by many countries. 
Non-judicial review is not as famous as the judicial 
review where only few countries have that mecha-
nism, such as Dutch, France, and Ethiopia. 
The institutionalization of the judicial insti-
tution to conduct the review of the constitutionality 
of laws is a universal contemporer state phenom-
enon. This phenomenon is common to be conceptu-
alized with the term of juristocracy (which literally 
means the government by the judges) to describe 
the movement of state power in formulating poli-
cies from the bodies of the house of representatives 
into the judiciary. Ran Hirschl explains this phe-
nomenon that: 
Over the past few years the world has wit-
nessed an astonishingly rapid transition to 
what may be called juristocracy. Around the 
globe, in more than eighty countries and in 
several supranational entities, constitutional 
reform has transferred an unprecedented 
amount of power from representative institu-
tions to judiciaries [...] National high courts 
and supranational tribunals have become in-
creasingly important, event crucial, political 
decision-making bodies.6 
The institution of judicial review of the con-
stitutionality of laws is believed and hoped to be 
capable to ascertain the protection of human rights 
of minority and the authority of majority. Judges 
are believed to be capable to be imparcial because 
they are free from any political pressure (judicial 
independence principle). Hirschl states that:  
Democracy is not the same thing as major-
ity rule; that in a real democracy (namely a 
constitutional democracy rather than a demo-
cracy governed predominantly by the princi-
ple of parliamentary sovereignty), minorities 
possess legal protections in the form of a 
written constitution, which even a democra-
tically assembly cannot change. Under this 
vision of democracy, a bill of rights is part 
of fundamental law, and judges who are re-
moved from the pressures of partisan politics 
are responsible for enforcing those rights. 
Based on that, so this paper suggests that function-
ally, institutions of judicial review of the constitu-
tionallity of laws are required in ascertaining the 
protection and enforcement of human rights.8 
Institutionally, there are two approaches in 
applying the system of judicial review of the con-
stitutionallity of laws, namely concentrated or mo-
nopolized constitutional jurisdiction and diffuse 
judicial review. Concentrated constitutional juris-
diction means that an institution is established for 
particular duty which is to conduct judicial review 
of the constitutionallity of laws, such as the Federal 
Constitutional Court in Germany and the Constitu-
tional Court in Indonesia). While, diffuse judicial 
review is employed by USA judicial institutions. 
This authority is well organized by the Federal and 
State Court.9  In literatures, these two different de-
signs are concepted as American-style Judicial Re-
view and Kelsen’s Court Represented by Countries 
which employ the concentrated judicial review. 
Sweet formulates four core elements from Kelsen’s 
court as the contrary of the American-style judicial 
review, namely:10
First, constitutional courts enjoy exclusive 
and final constitutional jurisdiction. For-
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mally, constitutional judges possess a mo-
nopoly on the exercise of constitutional re-
view, while the judiciary remains prohibited 
from engaging in review. Second, terms of 
jurisdiction restrict constitutional courts to 
the settling of constitutional disputes. Con-
stitutional judges do not preside over judicial 
disputes or litigation, which remain the func-
tion of judges sitting on the ordinary courts. 
Instead, specifically designated authorities 
or individuals ask questions of constitutional 
courts, challenging the constitutionality of 
specific legal acts; constitutional judges are 
then required to answer these questions, and 
to give reasons for their answers. Their de-
cisions are final. Third, constitutional courts 
have links with, but are formally detached 
from, the judiciary and legislature. They oc-
cupy their own ‘constitutional’ space, which 
is neither clearly ‘judicial’ nor ‘political’. 
Fourth, unlike the situation in the US, consti-
tutional courts may review legislation before 
it has been enforced, as a means of elimina-
ting unconstitutionality prior to harm being 
done. Thus, in the European model, the ordi-
nary judges remain bound by the supremacy 
of statute in the legal order, while constitu-
tional judges are charged with preserving the 
supremacy of the constitution.
The character of concentrated judicial review 
in Kelsen’s Court is explicitly shown in the first and 
second criteria. These criterias are significantly dif-
ferent with American-style Judicial Review which 
is conducted by the Supreme Court of the United 
States. Constitutionally, the Supreme Court of the 
United States does not have particular jurisdiction 
to conduct the review of the constitutionallity of 
laws. That jurisdiction is established by the particu-
lar interpretation of the Supreme Court terhadap the 
Constitution of the United States about the basic 
function of ajudication which the Court has. Alex-
ander M. Bickel explains that:11  
The least dangerous branch of the American 
government is the most extraordinarily po- 
werful court of law the world has ever known. 
The power which distinguishes the Supreme 
Court of the United States is that of constitu-
tional review of actions of the other branches 
of government, federal and state. Curiously 
enough, this power of judicial review, as it 
is called, does not derive from any explicit 
constitutional command. The authority to 
determine the meaning and application of a 
written constitution is nowhere defined or 
even mentioned in the document itself. This 
is not to say that the power of judicial review 
cannot be placed in the Constitution; merely 
that it cannot be found there.
The Indonesian Constitutional Court follows 
the Kelsen’s Court Model, but those four criterias 
are not fully implemented, such as the jurisdiction 
and preview competence. The differences between 
the concentrated judicial review of American-style 
Judicial Review and diffuse judicial review consist 
of several ratios. In countries which do not have 
the stare decisis principle, diffuse judicial review 
will not really influence in constitutional sectors 
because decisions cannot be enforced erga omnes, 
but in contrary where decisions are enforced inter 
parties. As a result, to answer that condition, Coun-
tries which do not have stare decisis princple prefer 
to choose concentrated judicial review. The absence 
of stare decisis principle will result in problems in 
predictability and uniformity.12
When there are substantial similarities bet-
ween diffuse judicial review and concentrated judi-
cial review, these similarities are more crucial than 
the differences which are merely technical. In this 
context, it is also according to the Andrade’s opi-
nition which states that “Notwithstanding its dis-
tinctive features, however, both the United States 
and Continental Europe adopted judicial review as 
a constitutional device to protect the fundamental 
laws.”13  Moreover, Andrade concludes that:14
Both in the United States and Europe, courts 
have been playing a very important role in 
the preservation of individual liberties. The 
need for an effective check on legislative 
majorities, thus, seems to be the main force 
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compelling different legal systems to confer 
upon their courts—constitutional or not—the 
power to review legislation repugnant to the 
constitution.
On the other hand, the non judicial review 
has rationality to be a sollution to counter-majori-
tarian difficulty.15 Supporting argument as justifica-
tion on this approach is the purity of the implemen-
tation of trias politica principle. Judicial review of 
the constitutionallity of laws is presummed uncom-
patible with the pure trias politica principle so that 
the sollution is that the authority of review of the 
constitutionality of laws is given to non-judiciary 
institutions (Non-judicial review). Incompability 
between trias politica principle and judicial review 
of the constitutionality of laws is created because 
that practices results in difficulties to differ between 
the legislation functions and ajudication functions 
which are the traditional concepts of trias poli-
tica principle. Even, Kelsen explicitly states that 
“The judicial review of legislation is an obvious 
encroachment upon the principle of separation of 
powers.”16
As stated by Kelsen, in such authority, Judges 
have the political function to conduct rule-making. 
As a result, this function shall not be conducted by 
the ordinary judiciary, but by judges and the special 
judiciary.17 Then, this matter results in the idea to 
establish Constitutional Courts which are different 
with ordinary judiciary. Since the inventor of con-
stitutional court is Kelsen, the constitutional court 
is well-known as Kelsen’s Court. Constitutional 
court is different with other ordinary courts because 
constitutional court is a legislator.which is nega-
tive legislator. Sweet describes, negiative legislator 
theory introduced by Kelsen, that:18
Kelsen understood the constitutional review 
of statutes to be an inherently political ac-
tivity – however judicial in form – since the 
reviewing authority would inevitably partici-
pate in the legislative function. Nonetheless, 
he distinguished how parliaments and con-
stitutional courts make law. Parliaments, he 
argued, are “positive legislators,” since they 
make law freely, according to their own poli-
cy preferences, subject only to the constraints 
of the constitution (for example, rules of pro-
cedure). Constitutional judges, on the other 
hand, are “negative legislators,” whose legis-
lative authority is restricted to the annulment 
of statutes when they conflict with the law of 
the constitution.
According to reference above, the function 
of negative legislator is limited to reject legisla-
tions which contradict to the Constitution. In non-
judicial review approach, a legislative has inherent 
authority in conduction review of the constitution-
ality of laws (legislative review). This authority is 
self-control or self-correction in a legislation pro-
cecss conducted by a legislative which is based on 
general assumption that who forms a legislation 
shall correct the legislation in the first time. This ap-
proach is based on supremacy parliement principle 
which means: “Every statute that Parliament enacts 
is legally valid, and therefore that all citizens and 
officials, including the courts, are legally obligated 
to obey it. The courts’ legal obligation is therefore 
to interpret and apply every statute in a way that is 
consistent with Parliament’s legal authority to enact 
it, and their corresponding obligation to obey it.”19
However, that approach can be questioned on 
its effectivity based on the nemo iudex in causa sua 
principle which means “no one can be a judge for 
his/her case” because that person can never be ob-
jective. This argument is agreed by Arend Lijphart, 
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a bachelor of politicans, who states that “If parlia-
ment itself is the judge of the constitutionality of its 
own laws, it can easily be tempted to resolve any 
doubts in its own favor.”20  In countries which have 
non-judicial review approach, it does not mean that 
judicial institutions in those country cannot con-
duct judicial review of the constitutinality of laws. 
That judicial review is conducted indirectly and it 
is not meant to reject unconstitutional laws, but it 
is conducted by avoiding and interpreting laws so 
laws can be consistent to constitution (weak-form 
judicial review). Tushnet explains the weak-form 
judicial review concept as that:21
Courts assess legislation against constitution-
al norms, but do not have the final word on 
whether statutes comply with those norms. 
In some versions the courts are directed to 
interpret legislation to make it consistent 
with constitutional norms if doing so is fairly 
possible according to (previously) accepted 
standards of statutory interpretation. In other 
versions the courts gain the additional power 
to declare statutes inconsistent with consti-
tutional norms, but not to enforce such judg-
ments coercively against a losing party. In 
still others, the courts can enforce the judge-
ment coercively, but the legislature may re-
spond by reinstating the original le-gislation 
by some means other than a cumbersome 
amendment process.
That shows the flexibility of judiciary to avoid com-
plexity in the form of conflict between state institu-
tions in functional aspects.
In Dutch case, article 120 the Netherlands 
Constitution states explicitly that the judiciary does 
not have the authority to decide the unconstitution-
ality of laws and then, those laws are not binding. 
Polak and Polak strictly formulates judicial absent 
principle as the basis of Art. 120 of the Netherlands 
Constitution, “the judiciary has no authority to re-
fuse to apply a statute. The judiciary should con-
sume the legislature’s products even if they possess 
an unconstitutional or otherwise illegal flavour.”22 
That basis assumed by scholars as anomaly from 
constitutional system implemented by Dutch Cons-
titutional System. 
Perhaps, that system is the most satisfying 
system as a model of the establishment of constitu-
tional jurists who are adherents of popular constitu-
tionalism which gives emphasis on limit of judici-
ary power to be consistent to democracy principles. 
However, in terms of judicial independence princi-
ple, actually judges are possible to interpret laws so 
that those laws are in accordance to the Constitu-
tion. In this context, judges have done the review 
which is not apparent because it is the duty of legis-
latives to review laws as legislative products.
2. Marbury Case in The United States of 
America
As mentioned above, the historical event 
refered for institutionalization of judiciary in con-
ducting judicial review of the constitutionality of 
laws is the case of Marbury v. Madison (1803).23 
Therefore, understanding this case decided by the 
Supreme Court of the United States is unavoidably 
required. Before spesifically discussing the Mar-
bury v. Madison case, understanding the context of 
American constitutional system is required as the 
basis of the organization of institutions of judical 
review of the constitutionality of laws. 
U.S. Constitutional system with an institu-
tion of judicial review of the constitutionality of 
laws is commonly known as trias politica principle 
plus which means that trias politica principle with 
checks and balances principle are implemented in 
main government institutions (legislative, execu-
tive, and judiciary). If trias politica principle purely 
implemented, so as the theory, judiciay cannot pro-
ceed the constitutional issues of laws. U.S. Consti-
tutional system embracing trias politica plus princi-
ple can be seen from Gerber’s opinion that “without 
judicial review the Supreme Court would have no 
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‘constitutional control’ over the President and Cong- 
ress. As a consequence, judicial review is an inevi-
table component of the Constitution’s commitment 
to checks and balances.”24
The Gerber’s opinion is representative as 
opinion doctorum statement regarding to the mean-
ing of features of the U.S. Constitutional System in 
allowing the judiciary to review the constitutionality 
of laws as a form of ‘check’ on the legislative. 
Moreover, the meaning of check can be related to 
Trenor’s opinion that “judicial review, by keeping 
legislative power from overstepping its bounds 
with respect to other and competing institutional 
actors, had the goal of protecting against arbitrary 
government.”25 
The theorization on practices of judicial re-
view of the constitutionality of laws gives objec-
tive basis on that practices. In terms of the theo-
rization, the Marbury v. Madison is so proper to 
be discussed, including its relation to Indonesian 
Constitutional Court althought constitutional sys-
tems of both countries are different. This case is 
very monumental, landmark, and proper to be the 
justification to support the idea of judicial review of 
the constitutionality of laws although it is rejected 
as the justification. Tushnet in the book “Taking the 
Constitution Away from the Courts” suggests that 
“a constitutional amendment overruling Marbury v. 
Madison.”26
The main focus of the author is what impor-
tant principle of this case to address the issue of ju-
dicial justification of testing the constitutionality of 
laws. At the next level is what makes the justifica-
tion of morally and politically acceptable and can 
be generalized. This last point relates to the external 
implications of the case that inspired many coun-
tries to replicate similar practices (although the in-
stitutional and functional format that is not always 
the same).
Marbury v. Madison case started from the 
politic intrigue in United States of America that 
appeared because of the power transition from the 
Federalist Party to the Republican Party. The in-
cumbent president candidate from Federalist Party; 
John Adams was defeated by candidate from Re-
publican Party which was Thomas Jefferson. In the 
end of his power, John Adams made the important 
decision by putting his man from his party to be 
federal judges. The base law of this decision was 
the Judiciary Act of 1801. In the last two months of 
Adam’s power, John Marshall had double position 
as Secretary of State and at the same time as Chief 
Justice of the Supreme Court. President Adams as-
signed Marshall on his capacity as a Secretary of 
State to prepare, signed (together with President 
Adams), and also gave the assigned letter to the 
people who will be stationed as judges. Hovewer, 
this process was not finished yet (the assigned let-
ter was not fully sent to the pointed people) until 
President Adams give his throne to Jefferson. Presi-
dent Jefferson then withdraws the decision made by 
Adams. The one who got the effect of that withdraws 
was William Marbury who was failed to become 
justice of peace. Marbury then sue James Madison; 
Secretary of State in Jefferson period to show the 
assigned letter that was signed by President Adams 
and Secretary of State Marshall through the law 
effort writ of mandamus.27  Reinstein & Rahdert 
said that there were three main issues in this case, 
namely: (1) the right of individuals to claim the pro-
tection of the laws; (2) the ideal that government is 
constrained by and subject to the laws; (3) the role 
of courts in constitutional government.28
The essential of this case was in adminis-
tration laws area, which is government obligation 
to give the personal document to the person who 
had the right. In this case, the law effort mandamus 
taken by Marbury (asked Madison to give the as-
sign letter to be Justice of peace) does not take too 
much attention. Precisely the landmark of this case 
was the action of the Supreme Court of the United 
States which did the constitutional judicial review 
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of the Judiciary Act of 1801. This case become so 
important because Art. III of the Constitution of the 
United States does not explicitly give the autho- 
rity to the supreme court of the USA to do judicial 
review. 
Chief justice Marshall was the intellectual 
actor behind the case Marbury v. Madison. The 
principle that become the guideline for Marshall in 
this case to give the authority for the implementa-
tion of judicial review of constitutionality of laws 
was the rule of law which is defined as “govern-
ment must operate by, and be subject to, the ideals 
of the rule of law.”29  Thus, it is a fortiori, in the 
judicial commission authority to apply and interpret 
the law as well as the inherent authority to declare 
illegitimate government action exceeded its author-
ity and invalidate legislation or regulation that is 
not illegal (against the law) to be consistent with 
the principle of the rule of law.30 
This principle according to Reinstein & 
Rahdert can be traced into the source of the rule of 
law principles inherited from English common law 
through its main exponent of William Blackstone. 
Reinstein & Rahdert then explain some aspects of 
the argument which seems counter-intuitive and 
paradoxical because the UK as a reference source 
of the principle of the rule of law that the justifica-
tion of the institution of judicial review is practiced 
by Marshall does not have a constitution, adheres to 
the principle of parliamentary supremacy and does 
not recognize the separation of governmental po-
wers.31 
The principle of the rule of law relied upon 
by both Britain and the United States is that ‘the 
government is subject to the law and that individu-
als may seek recourse in the courts for illegal ac-
tions by executive Officials’32  that ‘break the rules 
acts’ of any nature committed by government can 
be submitted to the court by the injured party as a 
result of such actions. In terms of that, the Chief 
Justice Marshall stated, “The very essence of civil 
liberty certainly consists in the right of every indi-
vidual to claim the protection of the law, whenever 
he receives an injury.”33 Connectedness between 
the United States with Britain concerning the sub-
jection to this principle Marshall is apparent from 
the following statement: “in Great Britain the king 
himself is sued in the respectful form of a petition, 
and he never fails to comply with the judgment of 
his court.34  To strengthen the argument quoting 
Marshall Blackstone in Commentaries on the Laws 
of England 23: “it is a settled and invariable prin-
ciple in the laws of England, that every right, when 
witheld, must have a remedy, and every injury its 
proper redress.”35  
Marshall then concluded his argument very 
well known that: “the government of the United 
States has been emphatically termed a government 
of laws, not of men. It will certainly cease to de-
serve this high appellation, if the laws furnish no 
remedy for the violation of a vested legal right.”36 
Marshall’s argument to justify the authority of ju-
dicial review of constitutionality of laws according 
Reinstein & Rahdert does not quote English rule 
of law principle but ‘derive from them’. Marshall’s 
argument is divided into five proportion:37  
1. In a case properly before it, the court is 
bound by an oath to decide according 
to the law;
2. If two laws are in conflict in that case, 
the court must choose which law to 
apply;
3. If one of the laws is superior to the 
other in importance and authority, that 
law must be held by the court to nul-
lify the lesser law;
4. The Constitution is a superior law to 
an ordinary statute and therefore must 
be held by the court to nullify a statute 
whose terms conflict with the Consti-
tution; and
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30   Ibid., p. 829.
31   Ibid., p. 797-798.
32   Ibid., p. 799.
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34   Marbury v. Madison, 163 in Ibid.
35   Marbury v. Madison, 163 in Ibid.
36   Marbury v. Madison, 163 in Ibid.
37   Ibid., p. 801.
5. It is the special province of the judi-
ciary to determine the meaning of all 
laws, including the Constitution.
These principles are familiar in England, 
except the fourth principle, which shows the revo-
lutionary nature of the doctrine of judicial review 
which is being developed by Marshall. Reinstein & 
Rahdert provided annotation as follows:38
Marshall’s fourth principle—that the Consti-
tution is superior to an act of Congress—of 
course finds no counterpart in English law. 
Nor is stated unambiguously in the Constitu-
tion. Although the Supremacy Clause estab-
lishes the hierarchy of federal over state law, 
it does not explicitly make the Constitution 
superior to acts of Congress or federal trea-
ties. The revolutionary doctrine in Marbury 
is that the Constitution is a law that is superi-
or to all other laws, including statutes enact-
ed by Congress. This explains why Marshall 
went to such lengths to prove the doctrinal 
supremacy of the Constitution, which is now 
considered obvious. By establishing that the 
Constitution is itself a law, and supreme to all 
other federal laws, Marshall could then place 
the Constitution at the apex of the hierarchy 
of laws and apply accepted English rule of 
law principles to establish judicial review.
Based on the four principles of the Marshall 
then it went a step further with the fifth principle 
being the ultimate justification for the institution of 
judicial review of the constitutionality of the law 
practiced that: “it is emphatically the province and 
duty of the judicial department to say what the law 
is.”39 
This statement by Reinstein & Rahdert had 
wider implications than simply deciding conflicts 
that occurred between the constitutions with the 
law: “His opinion in Marbury asserts more than 
simply the authority of the courts to interpret the 
Constitution and laws and decide conflicts between 
them. Importantly, it further asserts the authority of 
the courts to bind the other commissiones of gov-
ernment by its decisions.”40 But in the final analysis 
Reinstein & Rahdert argues that the judicial author-
ity of review of the constitutionality of the law of 
judicial commission is not necessarily the final arbi-
ter of constitutional interpretation of each product.
In principle, other government agencies, as 
a judicial commission, are bound by constitutional 
obligation within the framework of the rule of law 
to make decisions that are the constitutional integ-
rity of the constitution as the apex of the hierarchy 
of laws remains intact: “We do not mean to con-
tend that judicial review was regarded as the ex-
clusive mode of constitutional interpretation. The 
rules of law principles also require the President 
and members of Congress to the make constitution-
al decisions.”41  However, as stated by Alexander 
Hamilton in The Federalist No. 78, a judicial com-
mission has a special position in the sense of: “The 
interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar 
province of the courts. A constitution is, in fact, and 
must be regarded by the judges, as a fundamental 
law. It therefore belongs to them to ascertain its 
meaning, as well as the meaning of any particular 
act proceeding from the legislative commission.”42 
Discussion about the legitimacy of judicial 
review the constitutionality of laws for the U.S. 
case is very important because the Constitution of 
the United States did not authorize judicial review 
of the constitutionality of the law to the Supreme 
Court of the United States. In contrast with its coun-
terparts in the foregoing discussion, it is labeled 
Kelsen ‘s Court , which explicitly obtain the consti-
tutional guarantee to review the constitutionality of 
judicial legislation. Through the case of the United 
States, other judicial commission in other countries 
can learn to do the same even though the constitu-
tion does not provide explicit authorization for ju-
dicial review of the constitutionality of the law (for 
example practiced in the Mizrahi Case in Israel).43 
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38   Ibid., p. 802.
39   Marbury v. Madison, 177 in Op.cit., p. 803.
40   Ibid., pp. 802-803.
41   Ibid., p. 808.
42   Ibid., p. 809.
43   Guy E. Carmi, “A Constitutional Court in the Absence of a Formal Constitution? On the Ramifications of Appointing the Israeli Supreme 
Court as the Only Tribunal for Judicial Review”, Connecticut Journal of International Law, Vol. 21, No. 1, December 2005, pp. 67-91.
Lesson learned from the case of the United States 
was the pivot of the argument for judicial review 
of the constitutionality of laws on the nature of the 
roles of judges and judicial commission that can be 
generalized.
Principles as described above are a universal 
principle and very clear in justifying judicial review 
of the constitutionality of laws.44 These principles 
are universally acceptable because it does not con-
tain a contradiction understanding which can result 
in serious disagreement on the validity. However, 
the issue is whether these principles are sufficient 
(adequate) as justification for judicial review of the 
constitutionality of laws? As for the principle of ju-
dicial power commission, the principle of justify. 
Hovewer, as system compatibility in relation to the 
principles of power, other principles are not fully 
adequate (counter-majoritarian issue until the inter-
vention of the legislative power is political power 
that led to the idea of a concept which is commonly 
known as Kelsen’s Court).
In the final analysis, as a judicial function 
of the guardian of constitution through the judicial 
process of review of the constitutionality of the leg-
islation requires a prerequisite as a necessity, which 
is the guarantee of judicial independence. Guaran-
tee of judicial independence only occurs in coun-
tries based on the rule of law in accordance with the 
following Foster’s opinion: “An essential feature 
of the rule of law is that those who bring a case 
before the courts must be confident that the presid-
ing judge is not Undue under any pressure to de-
cide it in a particular way.”45 Therefore, on the basis 
of the guarantee of judicial independence, Gerber 
claimed: “judicial review is the ultimate expression 
of judicial independence, because without judicial 
independence no court could safely void an act of a 
coordinate political branch.”46 
C. Conclusion
The constitutionality of the law implicitly 
provides protection against the constitution or ba-
sic law. In order for the constitution or the constitu-
tion to be meaningful as a juridical document (legal 
document), it is necessary to have a guard or protec-
tion against the basic law. Meaning of substantial 
protection is to ensure compliance with legislators 
in the legislation to exercise power products (i.e the 
law) which is consistent with the constitution.
Most potential candidates as a guardian of 
the constitution, to review the constitutionality of 
the law, are a judicial commission. Declaring a law 
as unconstitutional because it conflicts with the 
Constitution is a part of the natural duty of the judi-
cial bodies in legal states. Options for this judicial 
commission are determined by two pre-conditions. 
Firstly, judicial commission, in the state based on 
the rule of law, has guarantees of independence. 
Secondly, traditionally, the judges believe to have 
interpretation skills. Review of the constitutionality 
of judicial legislation is a vehicle for the judges to 
apply the interpretation skills as believed by Alex-
ander Hamilton. Interpretation expertise is a legiti-
mate comparative advantage of the judicial com-
mission of other government agencies.
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